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Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to do Otherwise 
Patrick Todd 
The University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract 
 
I provide a manipulation-style argument against classical compatibilism – the 
claim that freedom to do otherwise is consistent with determinism.  My question 
is simple: if Diana (the designer) really gave Ernie (the designed) free will, why 
isn’t she worried that he won’t use it precisely as she would like?  Diana’s non-
nervousness, I argue, indicates Ernie’s non-freedom.  Arguably, the intuition that 
Ernie lacks freedom to otherwise is stronger than the direct intuition that he is 
simply not responsible; this result highlights the importance of the denial of the 
principle of alternative possibilities for compatibilist theories of responsibility.  
Along the way, I clarify the dialectical role and structure of “manipulation 
arguments”, and compare the manipulation argument I develop with the more 
familiar Consequence Argument.  I contend that the two arguments are 
importantly mutually supporting and reinforcing.  The result: classical 
compatibilists should be nervous – and if PAP is true, all compatibilists should 
be nervous.   
 
Introduction 
 
In contemporary debates about moral responsibility and determinism, one often 
encounters what have come to be called manipulation scenarios – roughly, scenarios in 
which a given agent’s behaviour has been secured in advance by powerful manipulators 
or designers working “behind the scenes”. Intuitively, so the thought goes, compatibilists 
will have to say that such agents may indeed be morally responsible for what they do. But 
(so the proponents of the arguments maintain) it is, intuitively, false that these agents 
may be responsible; so compatibilism is false.  The relevant scenarios are meant to elicit 
an intuition of non-responsibility. Broadly speaking, however, this has been an intuition 
compatibilists have either not shared or have otherwise wished to explain away.  Such 
has been, thus far, the debate concerning so-called “manipulation arguments”.   
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 Manipulation arguments, then, have primarily targeted moral responsibility – and 
they have targeted it directly.  In this paper, however, I wish to point out that proponents 
of such arguments may also target moral responsibility indirectly, by first targeting the 
freedom to do otherwise, and then by appeal to the traditional requirement, enshrined in the 
“principle of alternative possibilities” (PAP), that freedom to do otherwise is necessary 
for moral responsibility.  I believe that this is an underappreciated strategy in the 
compatibility debates.  As I hope to show, the intuition that the relevant (manipulated) 
agent lacks the freedom to do otherwise is arguably stronger than the (direct) intuition that 
the agent is simply not responsible.  In this paper, then, I will offer a manipulation 
argument against classical compatibilism – the claim the freedom to do otherwise is 
compatible with causal determinism.  Together with the principle of alternative 
possibilities, it would follow that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism – 
but I will not argue for any such principle here.1  I simply wish to highlight the availability 
of such an argument.2  Moreover, the failure of classical compatibilism, if it is a failure, is, 
of course, of independent interest, apart from the (putative) connection to moral 
responsibility.   
 Thankfully, the argument to come is simple – and brief.  It comes in the form of 
a story, and it begins with a familiar goddess named Diana.  I call it the “Why aren’t you 
worried?” argument, for reasons that will become clear momentarily.  I then discuss the 
relationship between this argument and two more traditional arguments in the free 
will/moral responsibility debates: (1) the “Consequence Argument” (for the 
incompatibility of the freedom to do otherwise and determinism) and (2) the “Direct 
Argument” (for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism).  Along the 
way, I attempt to clarify the dialectical role and structure of “manipulation” arguments in 
the relevant debates.   
 
The Zygote Argument  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 PAP, of course, has famously been called into question by the so-called “Frankfurt examples”.  
But the jury on such examples is still out; see, e.g., Franklin 2011, Capes 2014, and Swenson 2015 
for recent replies to the Frankfurt cases.  The present paper highlights the importance of the 
denial of PAP for compatibilist theories of moral responsibility.   
2 As I discovered after this paper was accepted, the availability of this strategy has indeed already 
been highlighted by Cohen 2015.  Cohen’s paper, however, focuses on Pereboom’s “Four Case” 
argument and the classical compatibilism of Kadri Vihvelin, and, in any case, does not appeal to 
the considerations about “nervousness” central to my argument below.  We thus employ 
substantially different resources to arrive at similar conclusions.  Naturally, however, I am 
sympathetic with much of what Cohen says.   
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Consider the following scenario described by Alfred Mele, which we can call the ‘‘Diana 
scenario’’:  
 
Diana [a goddess with special powers] creates a zygote Z in Mary. She combines 
Z’s atoms as she does because she wants a certain event E to occur thirty years 
later. From her knowledge of the state of the universe just prior to her creating Z 
and the laws of nature of her deterministic universe, she deduces that a zygote 
with precisely Z’s constitution located in Mary will develop into an ideally self-
controlled agent [Ernie] who, in thirty years, will judge, on the basis of rational 
deliberation, that it is best to A and will A on the basis of that judgment, thereby 
bringing about E.3  
 
In short, we’re asked to imagine that Diana (1) knows the (deterministic) laws of nature, 
(2) has the unilateral power to secure various sets of “initial conditions”, and (3) the 
computational power to deduce what happens in the future, given those conditions.  We 
then suppose that she wants there to be a given agent in 30 years that performs various 
actions, and thus secures the relevant set of initial conditions so as to guarantee such an 
agent performing those very actions.  We’re then asked to consider whether any such 
agent could fairly be blamed for performing them, in case the actions Diana wished the 
agent to perform would ordinarily be morally objectionable. It is expected that we would 
conclude that no such agent could fairly be blamed for performing those actions.  
Compatibilists, however, will have to suppose otherwise – for there is (plausibly) no 
difference between someone’s actions having been “set up” in the relevant way by Diana 
or instead by (otherwise similar) blind natural causes. In short, if you think that Ernie 
could not be to blame in the Diana scenario, then you must think that no one could be 
to blame in any deterministic scenario.  Accordingly, you must think that compatibilism 
about moral responsibility and determinism is false.4   
 
Why isn’t Diana worried?   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Mele 2006: 188. 
4 For a structurally similar (and highly influential) manipulation argument for incompatibilism, see 
Pereboom’s “Four Case” argument (the most recent statement of which is in Pereboom 2014: 
Ch. 4).  
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Thus proceeds the direct manipulation argument for incompatibilism concerning 
responsibility and determinism.  But consider now the following modifications to the 
“Diana scenario”.  We are, somehow, introduced to a powerful goddess, Diana, about 
whom, initially, we’re told nothing besides that she has extraordinary powers of creation.  
We discover that Diana wishes for there to be an agent who, in 30 years, faces a decision 
between lying and telling the truth.  And she wishes this agent (Ernie) to be torn about 
this decision; that is, she wishes Ernie to have and to see reasons on both sides of lying 
and telling the truth, in such a way that lying and telling the truth are both fully 
consistent with Ernie’s character.  Further, and crucially, Diana wishes it to come to pass 
that Ernie lies – but had it within his power to tell the truth.  That is, Diana wishes it to 
come to pass that though it is up to Ernie whether to lie or to tell the truth, Ernie in fact 
lies.  For Diana, it is important that Ernie be free not to lie – but also that he lies. 
Otherwise, she says, her plan is a failure.  Accordingly, she creates a set of initial 
conditions, presses play, and, as witnesses to her plans and activities, we wait.  For 29 
years and 364 days.   
  It comes to pass that there is a man named Ernie who feels torn about lying and 
telling the truth. And, we recall, it is highly important for Diana’s plans that Ernie lie.  
The moment of truth is approaching.  Ernie is deliberating.  And we’ve been told – and 
have been assuming – that, as promised, Diana has given Ernie free will with respect to 
lying and telling the truth. Some of us begin thinking: if I were Diana, I’d be getting 
nervous.  After all, Diana wants him to lie, but has left him free not to lie, and he’s torn 
about lying.     
 But then we notice something curious.  Diana seems perfectly relaxed.  In fact, 
she is tweedling her thumbs (in her celestial throne room).  We’re struck by her total lack 
of concern.  Thus begins the following exchange: 
 
Us: Diana, isn’t it important to you that Ernie lies here in a few minutes?   
 
Diana: Yes. 
 
Us: You realize that he’s currently deliberating about doing just that? And that 
he’s feeling awfully torn about what to do?   
 
Diana: Yes.  
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Us: And didn’t you say that you’ve left it up to Ernie whether to lie or tell the 
truth?  That is, didn’t you say that it would be up to him which to do?   
 
Diana: Yes.   
 
Us: Well, if it is really up to him, aren’t you in the least bit worried that he’s in fact 
going to tell the truth?   
 
Diana: No.   
 
Us: Why on earth not?  
 
Diana: Because I am entirely certain that he will lie.   
 
Us: But I thought you gave him free will – so couldn’t he refrain?   
 
Diana: I did give him free will, and yes, he has the power to refrain.  But I’m 
entirely certain that he won’t.   
 
Us: What, do you have a crystal ball or something?  
 
Diana: No, I don’t have a crystal ball.  And I have no magical powers of 
prevision.  And nor am I somehow “outside time”.  I’m just a goddess, not God. 
 
Us: Then how can you be so certain that Ernie’s going to lie, if he has the power 
to do otherwise, and sees every reason in the world not to?   
 
Diana: Because someone can be free not to do something, even if there is no 
objective chance whatsoever that he won’t.  And that’s what I’ve arranged.  Ernie 
is causally determined to lie, but is perfectly free not to.  Neat trick, isn’t it?    
 
And we walk off thinking: this is, indeed, a trick – if there ever was one. 
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The point is simple.  Genuine freedom, we think, should worry even someone 
like Diana. But this is not so, on classical compatibilism. Diana might have given Ernie 
free will, but might nevertheless have perfectly planned everything he ever does, and be 
appropriately absolutely certain that he will do only and everything she expects for him to 
do. But this result seems unacceptable.  If Diana’s plan involved Ernie’s having free will 
with respect to lying or telling the truth, then it should have involved her taking a risk, 
viz., the risk that he would tell the truth.  But she did not, in the above story, take any 
risk whatsoever.  Accordingly, it seems plain that she did not – contrary to her claim – 
indeed give Ernie free will.  Indeed, it seems farcical for Diana to claim that she gave 
Ernie free will concerning whether to lie or tell the truth, while sitting back and relaxing, 
having arranged matters so as to causally guarantee that he shall lie. Accordingly, 
whatever conditions the classical compatibilist identifies as being sufficient for the power 
to do otherwise are not sufficient, for Ernie (evidently) lacks any such power, but may 
perfectly well meet those conditions. More generally, any analysis of “could have done 
otherwise” that vindicates Diana’s responses in the above exchange is thereby a defective 
analysis, for Diana’s responses are defective.  Classical compatibilism – the position she 
represents as being the case – is therefore defective.    
To elaborate. It seems intuitive that, in the absence of a crystal ball, to believe 
that someone will perform an action he is free to refrain from performing, and torn 
about performing, is, necessarily, to risk being proved wrong. If his doing it is really up 
to him, then you’d have to be going out on a limb — at least somewhat — in believing 
that he’ll do it. That seems to be implied by our concept of freedom (to do otherwise); 
freedom, if we had it, would always involve the ability to prove wrong anyone who 
believed that we would do one thing rather than another. But if free will is compatible 
with determinism, this isn’t so, for it could be true that someone will freely do 
something, but one would not at all have to risk error in so believing, since one’s belief 
could be based on causal factors and laws that entail that the action occurs. And this 
seems odd.  This is, I believe, a result the (modified) “Diana scenario” helpfully brings 
out – and brings out in a forceful way.  If our belief that someone will do something is 
based on present causal factors and laws that guarantee that person’s action, then we take 
no risk at all in believing that the person will perform that action.  There thus seems to be 
a deep tension in regarding that person as free to refrain from performing that action, for 
(again, in absence of a crystal ball) to believe that someone will perform an action he is 
free not to perform (and, we might add, has motive and reason not to perform) is to risk 
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being proved wrong.  Ex hypothesi, however, we take no such risk.  The claim of freedom, 
then, seems questionable at best.  
I believe that these reflections allow us to see part of what is (arguably) so 
troubling about manipulation scenarios – or about taking ourselves to be like the subjects 
in such scenarios. We think that if we had genuine freedom, no one could just sit back 
and relax in perfect confidence that we will do only and exactly what she wants. But 
that’s the picture we get with Diana: she can just sit back and relax. Real freedom would 
make her nervous. If Diana isn’t nervous, then, it is because she didn’t give Ernie real 
freedom – that is, she didn’t really make it genuinely up to him what he does or becomes.  
 
Two Objections  
 
Here is the first:  
  
You say that Ernie’s freedom ought to engender Diana’s nervousness.  But in the 
history of western theism, we encounter a long tradition of thought according to 
which God infallibly knows exactly what we’re going to do, and yet we retain 
freedom to do otherwise. Many people take this point of view entirely seriously.  
It is not obvious, then, that, necessarily, freedom to do otherwise ought to 
engender just anyone’s nervousness.   
 
Granted.  But this is why I have emphasized that, lacking a crystal ball, Ernie’s freedom 
ought to imply Diana’s nervousness.  God, however, has a crystal ball – that is, with 
God, I admit, all bets are off.5  Recall this bit of the exchange:  
 
Us: But I thought you gave him free will – so couldn’t he refrain?   
 
Diana: I did give him free will, and yes, he has the power to refrain.  But I’m 
entirely certain that he won’t.   
 
Us: What, do you have a crystal ball or something?  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 However, if it were to become clear that God doesn’t have a crystal ball, but simply knows the 
future by determining it, then I would wish to say the same thing about God as I do about Diana; 
we could repeat the same argument in the case of God as I have given above.  I thank the editor 
of this journal for raising this point.      
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Note precisely how natural this question is in this context.  When Diana says that she is 
entirely certain that Ernie will lie, despite Ernie’s being torn about lying, and free not to 
lie, precisely the natural question here is: what, can you simply see the future? Now 
imagine that Diana’s response had instead been:  
 
Diana: Yes. Or I have what can only be explained to you, a mere mortal, as the 
possession of a crystal ball.   
 
If we were prepared to believe Diana on this score, then I admit that a natural extension 
of our conversation would be:  
 
 Us: Oh. Wow.  That is amazing.   
 
But we would not, I believe, immediately call into question Ernie’s freedom, if we were 
assuming that the grounds of Diana’s confidence (somehow) come from the future itself.  
(At most, the philosophers amongst us would start raising hackles about the possibility 
and presuppositions of Diana’s alleged crystal ball.) Further, just as we may note precisely 
how natural the above question sounds, we may note precisely how unnatural the 
following question sounds:  
 
Diana: I did give him free will, and yes, he has the power to refrain.  But I’m 
entirely certain that he won’t.   
 
Us: What, did you put in place causes sufficient to determine that Ernie shall lie, 
but which nevertheless leave him free to refrain from lying?  
 
This is, I submit, a question no one but a philosopher with a theory would ever think to 
ask.   
 Here is the second objection: 
 
In ordinary life, we often know what people are going to do, mostly because we 
know these people intimately – we know their characters and dispositions and 
the like.  But we do not thereby assume that, strictly speaking, they cannot do 
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otherwise than what we know they’re going to do.  For instance, I’ve known my 
significant other here for 25 years.  And I know that, here in a few moments, 
she’s going to order vanilla ice cream from the counter; that’s her favorite, and 
that’s what she always does. But of course she’s free not to order vanilla, and 
instead to order chocolate.   
 
I am prepared to admit that this is a natural thing to say.  But this is why I have 
emphasized that Ernie is torn with respect to lying and telling the truth, and that both 
lying and telling the truth are fully consistent with Ernie’s character.  That is, what we are 
considering here is not a case in which Ernie’s decision to lie is – as we would ordinarily 
say – predictable on grounds of Ernie’s settled dispositions.  Suppose, however, that this 
aspect of the setup of the story were removed.  And now imagine: 
 
Us: But I thought you gave him free will – so couldn’t he refrain?   
 
Diana: I did give him free will, and yes, he has the power to refrain.  But I’m 
entirely certain that he won’t.   
 
Us: What, do you have a crystal ball or something?  
 
Diana: No.  I just know Ernie.  He sees every reason in the world to lie, and no 
reason at all to tell the truth.  Of course Ernie’s going to lie!  Don’t you know 
Ernie?  I’m not worried in the slightest.  
 
The “restrictivists” amongst us might worry that, given the truth of this reply, Ernie’s 
freedom not to lie is indeed called into question: his hardened character removes his 
freedom.6  But I wish simply to sidestep this issue.  For this is not the reply that we 
receive; we are not assuming that Ernie’s lying is – in the perfectly ordinary way – 
predictable on the basis of his character.  If it isn’t, however, and Ernie is indeed torn, 
then whence comes Diana’s utter certainty that he will lie?  Again: she should be nervous. 
It is nerve-racking that she isn’t.    
 
A methodological interlude  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 For a defense of restrictivism, see van Inwagen 1989.  For criticism, see Fischer 1994: 47 - 62.   
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Such is, in brief, my proposed manipulation argument against classical compatibilism.  
But here it is worth pausing to make a point about the dialectical role of the “Diana 
scenario” in the relevant argument.  To repeat, my contention is this: it is in part because 
Diana is not nervous that we have reason to suppose that Ernie is not free.  Here it is 
tempting instead to write: it is because Diana is not nervous that Ernie is not free. Putting 
my point in this way may be tempting.  However, this temptation, if any are subject to it, 
should be resisted.  I am not claiming that it is because Diana is not nervous that Ernie is 
not free.  Rather, and crucially, I am claiming that it is because Diana is not nervous that 
we can tell that Ernie is not free – or at any rate, Diana’s not being nervous can help us in 
telling that Ernie is not free.  Diana’s not being nervous is good epistemic reason to suppose 
that Ernie is not free.  Needless to say, Diana’s not being nervous is not, on my proposal, 
part of what brings it about or makes it the case that Ernie is not free.  It is, again, simply an 
indicator of Ernie’s unfreedom.   
 We can look at the matter this way.  Suppose I said (what I do not say, and do 
not think should be said) that it is because Diana is not nervous that Ernie is not free.  
Such a position can seem to indicate the following: if the scenario were otherwise perfectly 
similar concerning Ernie, but Diana was nervous, then Ernie would (or may) be free.  But 
this is quite simply a mistake.  Suppose that Diana proceeds as in the above scenario, 
thereby in fact determining that in 30 years Ernie shall lie.  But suppose that, after a 
while, Diana forgets what she’s done concerning Ernie – did she calculate correctly?  
Was the law she put in place indeed the deterministic one?  She forgets – but now it is 
too late, and she must sit back and watch and see what Ernie does.  Accordingly, she 
becomes nervous regarding whether he will in fact lie or tell the truth.  Now, plainly, 
Diana’s being nervous, on my view, could not possibly bring it about that Ernie is in fact 
free to do otherwise.  If Ernie were not free to do otherwise when Diana remembers 
what she’s done (correctly determine for Ernie to lie), then plainly he is also not free 
when Diana has set up precisely the same determining conditions, but has simply 
forgotten that she’s done so.  Her forgetting, in itself, plainly could make no difference 
regarding Ernie’s freedom.  However, if it were because she is not nervous that Ernie is 
not free, then her forgetting may do precisely that – namely, engender some nervousness, 
thereby preventing her lack of nervousness from causing Ernie not to be free.  But this is 
plainly a mistake.   
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 Now, does this realization – that Diana’s not being nervous does not and could 
not make Ernie unfree – undermine the force of the argument? No.  For Diana’s not 
being nervous could play a role in helping us see that Ernie is not free, without playing a 
role in making Ernie unfree.  That is, the argument trades on tapping into (or trying to tap 
into) something like a pre-theoretical judgment (or a connected web of judgments) we 
have about the freedom to do otherwise, viz., that freedom to do otherwise should imply 
Diana’s being nervous.  That, the proponent of the argument hopes you’ll agree, is part 
of our pre-theoretical understanding of freedom to do otherwise.  (If it isn’t, then the 
argument is not a good argument, and that’s that.) If Ernie is indeed free to do 
otherwise, then why isn’t Diana nervous? Her non-nervousness, again, is a reliable 
indicator of Ernie’s non-freedom.  Insofar as we do judge that freedom to do to 
otherwise should imply Diana’s being nervous, this strategy is perfectly sensible, and 
perfectly legitimate – even if we concede that her nervousness is, in the sense described 
above, irrelevant to Ernie’s freedom.  In a word, Diana’s non-nervousness can play an 
epistemic role in indicating something about Ernie’s freedom, without playing a causal or 
(perhaps) metaphysical role in Ernie’s freedom.  And this is all that matters for the cogency 
of the argument.7  
 
The Consequence Argument and the Direct Argument  
 
At this stage, I wish to situate the argument I have presented within the context of two 
traditional arguments in the debates about free will and moral responsibility (with which 
I assume broad familiarity): the Consequence Argument, and the Direct Argument.8  By 
way of review: the Consequence Argument is an argument for the incompatibility of free 
will (understood as the ability to do otherwise) and determinism.  The central claim !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Here I am anticipating responses to the manipulation argument along the lines of Fischer 2011 
and King 2013. Their challenge can be summarized as follows:  
 
Either the manipulation does work in making the agent unfree, in which case the 
manipulation scenario is after all not equivalent to natural determination, or the 
manipulation does no work in making the agent unfree, in which case it is irrelevant to 
moral responsibility, and manipulation arguments get us nowhere.  
 
As I am trying to indicate, the problem with this argument regards the second ‘horn’ of the 
alleged dilemma.  As I have explained, the proponent of the manipulation argument can, and 
clearly should, grant that that the manipulation does not make the agent unfree, but simply shows 
or indicates something about the agent’s freedom.  For more on this point, see Todd 2013. For a 
defense of the manipulation argument’s propriety (with which I basically agree), see Tognazzini 
2014.  
8 See van Inwagen 1983: 55 – 105 (for the former) and 183 – 189 (for the latter).   
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undergirding the argument is as follows: If you are powerless to prevent one thing, and 
there is a necessary connection between that thing and another, then you are powerless 
to prevent the second thing as well.  More particularly, powerlessness “transfers” across 
necessary connections: this is the transfer of powerlessness principle.  Since, on 
determinism, there is a necessary connection between the past and the laws of nature 
with any fact at all, we therefore move from our powerlessness over the past and the 
laws to our powerlessness over anything.9  Accordingly, determinism implies that no one 
has the power the prevent anything that he or she in fact does – which is other words for 
the claim that no one has the freedom to do otherwise.   
 Now, the Consequence Argument simply targets the freedom to do otherwise. In 
order to forge a connection to moral responsibility, we would have to suppose, in 
accordance with (some suitable version of) the principle of alternative possibilities, that 
such freedom is required for responsibility.  Accordingly, the Consequence Argument 
targets responsibility only indirectly – via a conjunction with a principle like PAP.  The 
Direct Argument, however, uses similar “ingredients” as the Consequence Argument, 
but it targets moral responsibility directly.  The central claim undergirding the argument is 
as follows: If you are not morally responsible for one thing, and there is a necessary 
connection between that thing and another, then you are not morally responsible for the 
second thing either.  More particularly, non-responsibility “transfers” across necessary 
connections: this is the transfer of non-responsibility principle.  As before, given 
determinism, we thus transfer our non-responsibility for the past and the laws to our 
non-responsibility for anything.  Accordingly, determinism implies that no one is morally 
responsible for anything that he or she does.   
 Now we may note the following.  It is, it would appear, widely agreed that the 
Consequence Argument is more plausible than the Direct Argument.  That is, it is widely 
agreed that the transfer of powerlessness principle is more evident than the parallel transfer 
of non-responsibility principle.  Indeed, if I may sum up the current “state of the debate” 
concerning these arguments, we may note the following.  There is, at present, 
disagreement concerning the validity of the transfer of non-responsibility principle; cases 
of “simultaneous overdetermination” would seem to provide counterexamples to the 
principle in question, counterexamples both sides of the debate would seem to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 It is controversial whether the “Consequence Argument” indeed does require the transfer of 
powerlessness principle; Fischer 1994: 62 – 66, for instance, contends that it doesn’t.  I hereby set 
this question aside.   
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recognize.10 At any rate, such cases, many seem to think, call into question the dialectical 
usefulness of an appeal to the transfer of non-responsibility principle; in particular, if the 
principle is modified so as to escape such cases, then it becomes dangerously close 
simply to the assertion of incompatibilism.11  However, there is not a similar state of 
affairs concerning the parallel transfer of powerlessness principle.  (Here I am thinking of 
what has come to be called “Beta-box”.12) There are no cases that are currently widely 
agreed (by partisans of both sides of the debate) to call this principle into question. And 
there have emerged no cases that have forced a modification of this principle, such that 
any modified principle appears to be lacking in dialectical force.13   
 Here, then, I wish to make several points.  First: the above state of affairs accords 
with my own intuitive judgment: it is more plausible that Ernie lacks freedom to do otherwise 
than that he is simply not responsible.  Now, I believe that it is plausible that Ernie is not 
responsible – and I believe that this is plausible, just on considering the facts of the story, 
and not only in conjunction with a principle like PAP.  As I see it, the fact that Ernie is 
guaranteed to live out Diana’s plan for his life, by itself, indicates something about his 
responsibility – namely, that he lacks it.  That is, in just the same way that Diana’s non-
nervousness (to me) indicates his non-freedom, the fact that his life is entirely scripted in 
advance by someone else (to me) indicates his non-responsibility.  It is, I think, simply 
part of our (or anyway my own) pre-theoretical “stock of judgments” about moral 
responsibility that a morally responsible agent’s life cannot be entirely “scripted out” in 
the relevant way.  This is, anyway, how I see it – and how many others see it.14  
Nevertheless, the point remains: however directly intuitive it is (on account of Ernie’s 
living out Diana’s plans) that Ernie is simply not responsible, it is even more directly 
intuitive (on account of Diana’s non-nervousness) that he lacks freedom to do otherwise. 
In particular, I suspect that at least some who judge that Ernie is (or may be) responsible will 
nevertheless judge that Ernie is not free to do otherwise – and I suspect that no one who 
judges that Ernie is indeed free to do otherwise will nevertheless judge that Ernie is not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 For such counterexamples, see Fischer and Stump 2000 and Fischer 2004 (both reprinted in 
Fischer 2006).    
11 See Fischer 2004 in Fischer 2006: 168 – 173. 
12 Beta-box can be rendered as follows: Np, □(p→q) ˫ Nq, where “N” is the “no one has a 
choice about” operator, and “□” is broadly-logical (or metaphysical) necessity.  Beta-box is so-
called because it replaces an “N” in van Inwagen’s original “principle Beta” (Np, N(p→q) ˫ Nq) 
with the “box” of metaphysical necessity.  
13 See, e.g. Widerker 1987, Finch and Warfield 1998, van Inwagen 2000, and Speak 2011: 120.  As 
Campbell (2011: 49) writes, “There are no known counterexamples to principle (β’) [Beta-box].” 
14 For a defense of this point of view, see Todd 2011, 2012, and 2013. 
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responsible.15  The plausibility of Ernie’s not being free to do otherwise highlights, I 
believe, the importance of the denial of PAP for compatibilist theories of moral 
responsibility.   
 But now we must return to the Consequence Argument and the Direct 
Argument.  As I had just explained, it is widely agreed that the Consequence Argument is 
more plausible than the Direct Argument: whereas there remains controversy regarding 
the transfer of non-responsibility principle and its dialectical propriety, there is not a 
parallel controversy regarding the transfer of powerlessness principle. And this fact could 
seem to call into question the very purpose of this paper.  After all, the primary point of 
this paper is to offer an argument against classical compatibilism.  By the looks of it, 
however, it can seem that this project is unnecessary, for, one may think, the 
incompatibility of the ability to do otherwise and determinism has in effect already been 
established – or established to nearly everyone’s satisfaction. As I noted, and as nearly 
everyone agrees, there are no good counterexamples to Beta-box.  What more needs to 
be seen? 
Such a line of thought, however, misses what is arguably the most attractive 
“reply” to the Consequence Argument.  The most attractive reply to the argument does 
not attempt to construct a counterexample to “Beta-box” that will sway even the 
incompatibilist.  (Nor does it maintain that we can prevent the past or the laws of 
nature.) Rather, the most attractive reply to the Consequence Argument seeks to show 
that the transfer principle is valid only for a sense of “power to do otherwise” that simply 
does not appear in ordinary life and in our ordinary thought and talk.  When we ordinarily 
say that someone could have done otherwise, and when we ordinarily think of ourselves as 
free to do otherwise, then we have in mind a sense of “power” for which the transfer 
principle is simply invalid.  All we mean is something like the following: if that person 
had wanted (or had tried, or…) to do otherwise, nothing would have prevented her from 
doing so.  Accordingly, she could have done otherwise.  However, once the “conditional” 
nature of what we ordinarily mean by “freedom to do otherwise” is understood, we’ll see 
that the transfer principle is invalid as applied to what we ordinarily mean.16   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 This point accords with Widerker’s contention that the Direct Argument depends on the 
Consequence Argument.  If you think that a determined agent may have freedom to do 
otherwise, you will not think that she must lack moral responsibility.  For discussion, see 
Widerker 2002.   
16 This point has been made in various places.  Kane, e.g., makes the point forcefully (and simply) 
in his 2005: 27 - 28.  
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The best way to deflect this compatibilist reply to the Consequence Argument is 
by embedding the incompatibilist’s analysis of the “freedom to otherwise” within a wider 
set of judgments and attitudes we pre-theoretically have about such freedom.  And this is 
precisely what the manipulation argument seeks to do: it seeks to situate our ordinary 
judgments of someone’s being free to otherwise in a context in which it can then be seen 
that the ordinary assumption of such freedom implies the falsity of determinism.  It is in 
this sense that the manipulation argument can support the Consequence Argument.17  
Recall the (modified) Diana scenario I presented above.  We initially assume that Ernie is 
free not to lie, as Diana wants – free, precisely in the ordinary sense of “free not to lie”.  
We assume it is up to Ernie whether to lie – up to, precisely in the ordinary sense of its 
being “up to someone” whether to lie.  No special context has yet been created.  And yet 
it seems clear that, if Ernie is free in this sense, then Diana should be nervous – absent 
some appeal to Diana’s possessing a crystal ball.  And once we understand the grounds 
for Diana’s non-nervousness, precisely the ordinary sense of freedom we thought Ernie 
had is now called into question.18   
The upshot is the following.  The Consequence Argument is, by itself, a powerful 
argument.  And perhaps that argument, by itself, is enough to overturn classical 
compatibilism and establish the incompatibility of freedom to do otherwise and 
determinism.  Perhaps.  Even if this were so, however, this would not imply that there 
could not be additional evidential considerations that support the denial of classical 
compatibilism.  Indeed, if the Consequence Argument is sound, and sound as applied to 
our ordinary conception of freedom to do otherwise, then it would be frankly bizarre if its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Essentially the same point may be made concerning manipulation arguments (that directly 
target moral responsibility) and the Direct Argument: the two arguments are mutually supporting 
and reinforcing.  Indeed, this point has been made by Michael McKenna: “This kind of 
argument, a Manipulation Argument, could be used in the service of advancing the Direct 
Argument, and in particular, in the service of arguing for the controversial claims of 
nonresponsibility that I have focused upon in my rejection of the Direct Argument.” (2008: 380) 
18 As an anonymous referee for this journal has noted, this does not imply that all senses of 
“having an ability” are incompatible with determinism.  The incompatibilist should allow that the 
possession of general abilities is compatible with determinism; we may allow that Ernie possessed 
the general ability to tell the truth (he knows what telling the truth is, at least sometimes tells the 
truth, and so forth).  As Randolph Clarke notes (following others), there are various things we 
might have in mind when saying that S “has an ability to (is able to, can) A”, one of which is 
simply that “S has a general capacity to A.”  But we might also have in mind the more specific, 
“S has a general capacity to A, and S has a choice (at some specified time) about whether she (at 
some specified time) exercises that capacity.”  (337) As Clarke notes, “Something of the sort 
characterized by [this latter claim] is what many writing on free will have in mind.” (339). It is this 
claim that I have targeted in this paper.    
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soundness did not “ramify out” into our wider thought and talk about freedom to do 
otherwise.  That is, it would be bizarre if there were no further evidence (buried in our 
dispositions to ascribe or deny freedom) that freedom to do otherwise is incompatible 
with determinism.  Indeed, we would expect us to have a stock of judgments (roughly 
speaking) that support the incompatibilist’s analysis of freedom.  And this is, indeed, 
precisely what I have tried to show that we do in fact find. Further, if we did not find the 
manipulation argument at all compelling, this would be excellent evidence that the 
Consequence Argument is leading us astray.  The manipulation argument, however, is 
compelling – or so it seems to me.  The two arguments are therefore mutually supporting 
and reinforcing.   
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have primarily advanced a manipulation argument for the incompatibility 
of freedom to do otherwise and determinism. As I see it, if Diana genuinely gave Ernie 
free will, then she should be nervous that he won’t use it precisely as she would like.  
This thought, even if not absolutely irresistible, nevertheless seems deeply compelling.  If 
so, then we have further, additional reason for the following conclusion: classical 
compatibilists should be nervous.19   
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